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INTRODUCTION

The law of patent claim construction has been in flux over the past
twenty years.' Patent claim construction is integral to the function of the
patent system. 2 Patent claims are the elements of the patent document that
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, University of Florida Levin College of Law.
1. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Teva Pharms.
USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d
1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc);
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir.2005) (en banc).
2.

See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent
243

244
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define the boundaries of the holder's property rights. 3 As such, claim
construction has the potential to be outcome determinative in a majority
of patent litigation. 4 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
originally created by Congress with the intent to provide uniformity and
predictability to this area of the law,5 has been increasingly reviewed and
reversed by the Supreme Court. 6 Concurrently, the Federal Circuit has
been reversing the district courts on matters of claim construction at a
very high rate.7 The Federal Circuit's high reversal rate, combined with
the increasing intervention by the Supreme Court in cases concerning
intellectual property law, has frustrated the objectives of Congress in
creating the court. The law surrounding patent claim construction is
particularly uncertain, creating inefficiencies by increasing litigation.
All this uncertainty sprouted from one case, Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (Markman II). A close reading of
this case reveals a fundamental flaw in reasoning that, when reexamined,
leads to the conclusion that this uncertainty could be remedied. This Note
argues that the decision in Markman II was based substantially on a faulty
premise: that judges, as opposed to juries, are better equipped to construe
patent claims. Part I of this Note summarizes the law of patent claim
construction, with an emphasis on the Court's opinion in Markman II. In
Part II, this Note suggests this premise of judicial superiority espoused in
Markman II has been refuted by the data on the analysis of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In Part III, this Note argues in favor
of reversing Markman II and extending the Seventh Amendment right to
a jury trial on issues of patent claim construction.

Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 8 (2001) (asserting that claim construction is the most important
subsidiary issue in an infringement suit).
3. Markman, 517 U.S. at 372.
4. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995)

(Mayer, C.J., concurring) ("[T]o decide what the claims mean is nearly always to decide the
case."); Christian A. Chu, EmpiricalAnalysis of the FederalCircuit's Claim Construction Trends,
16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1154 (2001); Peter S. Menell et al., Patent Claim Construction:A
Modern Synthesis and Structured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 714 (2010).
5. E.g., Markman, 517 U.S. at 390.
6. See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, The Return of the Supreme Court to Patent Law, 1
AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 2, 25 (2007); Kevin R. Casey & Kevin B. Anderson, The Supreme
Court's Six-Pack of Cases, 27 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 9, 9 (2015).
7. E.g., Chu, supra note 4; Moore, supra note 2, at 1; Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight
Years Later: Is Claim ConstructionMore Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231 (2005);
Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction,Appeal, and the Predictabilityof Interpretive Regimes,
61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033 (2007); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical
Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223 (2008).
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PART I

A. Patent Claim Construction Under Markman II
In 1996, the Supreme Court issued its unanimous landmark decision
in Markman II holding patent claim construction is a matter of law
exclusively reserved for the judge to determine. 8 At issue in Markman II
was whether construction of a patent was a matter of law reserved entirely
for the judge, or whether it was "subject to a Seventh Amendment
guarantee that a jury will determine the meaning of any disputed term of
art about which expert testimony is offered." 9 The petitioner in this patent
infringement suit, Markman, owned a patent for his "Inventory Control
and Reporting System for Drycleaning [sic] Stores." 10 The respondent
created a similar product for dry cleaning stores." The issue of
infringement hinged primarily on the word "inventory" contained in
Independent Claim 1 of Markman's patent. 12
The jury found that Westview's product infringed Markman's valid
patent, but the district court granted Westview's motion for judgment as
a matter of law based on the court's own construction of "inventory."13
The court reasoned that Markman's patent claimed a system with the
ability to track the individual articles of clothing, or "inventory," through
every step of the cleaning process. 14 As Westview's product in no way
tracked the articles of clothing, its product did not infringe Claim 1 of
Markman's patent.is
Markman appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, arguing it was error for the district court to substitute its
construction of the disputed term for the jury's. 16 The Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court's rulings (Markman I), stating that patent claim
construction was a pure issue of law to be reviewed de novo on appeal. 17
The Federal Circuit reasoned that the Seventh Amendment did not
mandate a jury trial on issues of patent claim construction,18 and that
consistency of claim construction would be better served by judicial
construction. 19
8.
9.

Markman, 517 U.S. at 372.
Id.

10.
11.

Id. at 374.
Id.

12.

Id. at 375.

13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.
Id.

16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 376.
Markman v. Westview Instruments, 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
Id. at 984.
Id. at 978.
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Subsequently, Markman sought review in the Supreme Court. 20
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Souter analyzed whether there was
a right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment on issues of patent
construction. 2 1 The Seventh Amendment analysis consists of a two-part
inquiry. First, the Court asks "whether we are dealing with a cause of
action that either was tried at law at the time of the founding or is at least
analogous to one that was." 22 If the Court determines that the action was
historically tried at law, then the Court asks whether that particular
decision must fall to the jury to preserve the substance of the right as it
existed in 1791.23 Under the first inquiry, the Court stated the ultimate
issue of patent infringement was inarguably an issue which was
historically tried by a jury, so the Seventh Amendment undeniably
attaches to that issue. 24
As construction of the patent's claims is a necessary predicate to
determining the ultimate issue of infringement, the Court next considered
whether a particular issue contained in a jury trial is also necessarily an
issue for the jury. 25 Justice Souter described the task of patent
construction as a "mongrel practice,"26 and argued the closest 18th
century analogue to modern claim construction was the construction of
patent specifications. 27 After briefly describing the lack of historical
support for construction of specifications by juries, 28 the Court argued
there was at least some evidence judges were historically charged with
construing patent specifications. 29 Thus, the Court determined the
Seventh Amendment did not guarantee a right to have patent claim
construction tried to a jury. 30
Accordingly, the Court moved on to examine the relative abilities of
judges and juries to construe patent claims. Justice Souter wrote when
"history and precedent provide no clear answers, functional
considerations also play their part in the choice between judge and jury
to define terms of art." 31 In arguing that judges are much better suited to
construe patents, Justice Souter dismissed the traditional arguments
supporting jury determinations. 32 He reasoned that credibility decisions
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Markman, 517 U.S. at 376.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 376.
Id.
Id. at 377.
Id.
Id. at 378.
Id. at 379.

28.

Id. at 379-80.

29.
30.
31.

Id. at 382.
Id. at 383.
Id. at 388.

32.

Id. at 388-89.
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would be necessary only in the rarest cases. 33 He also argued that stare
decisis would be a better guarantee of uniform construction of similar or
identical terms than issue preclusion. 34 Thus, the Court ruled that patent
claim construction was a matter of law solely for the judge to determine.
Importantly, however, the Court did not address the standard of review
to be applied to issues of patent construction on appeal.3 5
B. Post-Markman II Jurisprudence
Following the Court's decision in Markman II, the Federal Circuit was
left to decide which standard of review to apply when confronted with
patent construction issues on appeal. In 1998, the Federal Circuit decided
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
banc), reaffirming its assertions from Markman I that, as a pure issue of
law, de novo review applied to patent claim construction. In Cybor, the
Federal Circuit determined it was necessary to address which standard of
review to apply when reviewing patent claim constructions of the district
courts. 36 The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, reasoned that the Supreme

Court implicitly approved of its assertions in Markman I that patent claim
construction was a purely legal question to be reviewed de novo.37 The
Federal Circuit explicitly stated that no deference should be afforded to
any of the district court's determinations on issues of claim
construction. 3 8
Chief Judge Mayer, concurring in the judgment but writing separately
to address the Federal Circuit's reading of Markman II, stated that the en
banc majority "profoundly misapprehend[ed]" Markman II.3 9 Judge
Mayer correctly summarized the basis of the Supreme Court's holding in
Markman II as follows:
The Supreme Court concluded there that the historical record is
insufficiently firm to declare that juries construed patent claims in
England when the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution was
adopted in 1791. So it decided as a matter of policy that judges, not
juries, are better able to perform this task given the complexity of
evidence and documentation. 40
He then argued that juries are regularly charged with interpreting
33.

Id. at 389-90.

34.

Id. at 391.

35.

Id.

36.
37.

Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454-55 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
Id. at 1455.

38.

Id.

39.
40.

Id. at 1463.
Id. at 1463-64.
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evidence and testimony on issues with greater complexity than patent
claim term construction. 4 1 Notwithstanding these faults with the
Markman Il logic, Judge Mayer next pointed out that the Federal Circuit
was bound by the Supreme Court's holding in Markman II, not its own
opinion in Markman I, as the Court did not adopt the Federal Circuit's
reasoning, in whole or in part. 42 He pointed out that the Court was silent
in Markman II as to the standard of review going forward, and observed
that the Court could not have intended to amend the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or Evidence with respect to district court fact finding in
Markman II.43 For these reasons, he argued that the standard of review
should be de novo for the construction of the entire patent, but should be
"clear error" for review of underlying factual determinations of disputed
facts by the district courts. 44
In 2014, the Federal Circuit again reaffirmed its rulings from
Markman I and Cybor in its decision in Lighting Ballast Control v.
Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
The Federal Circuit agreed to reconsider Cybor, and invited briefing and
amicus curiae on the matter.45 The Federal Circuit considered three
different approaches to the standard of review for patent claim term
construction. 46 The first, asserted by Lighting Ballast, characterized
construction of the patent document as a totally factual determination
made by the district court pursuant to Markman II and, as such, a "clear
error" standard of review should be applied.4 7
The second approach, which was argued by the United States and
others, consisted of a hybrid standard under which the "clear error"
standard would apply to any factual determinations made by the district
court pursuant to Rule 52(a), but the de novo standard would apply to
construction of the patent as a whole. 4 8 The third and final approach,
supported by some curiae, asserted that the Federal Circuit's holding in
Cybor was both reasonable and correct. 49 The proponents of the third
approach also argued that there was insufficient reasons presented to
overrule stare decisis. Thus, claim construction should remain a purely
legal issue reviewed de novo.5 0
The Federal Circuit correctly framed the issue, not as what standard
41. Id. at 1464.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Lighting Ballast Control v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1276 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (en banc).
46. Id. at 1277.
47. Id. at 1277-78.
48. Id. at 1278.
49. Id. at 1279.

50.

Id.
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of review to adopt for patent construction, but rather whether to disregard
stare decisis and change the standard of review after fifteen years of
Cybor.5 1 With the question framed this way, it comes as no surprise that
the Federal Circuit reaffirmed Cybor, declined to extend any deference to
the district courts' subsidiary factual determinations, and clung to its de
novo standard of review over patent claim construction. 52
C. The New Hybrid Standardof Review for Patent Claim Construction
After staying silent on the matter for almost two decades, the Supreme
Court finally stepped in and clarified the standard of review for patent
construction in Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831
(2015). This case revolved around the term "molecular weight" contained
in a patent owned by Teva Pharmaceuticals. The Teva patent claimed a
method of producing a drug used to treat multiple sclerosis. 53 The
relevant language in the patent claim described a polymer with "a
molecular weight of 5 to 9 kilodaltons." 54 The respondents, Sandoz,
decided to market a generic version of the drug, and subsequently Teva
sued for infringement.55
The respondents defended the suit by arguing the patent claims
containing the term were invalid due to indefiniteness. 56 They claimed
that "molecular weight," in the context of this patent, could have one of
three meanings:
The phrase might refer (1) to molecular weight as calculated by the
weight of the molecule that is most prevalent in the mix that makes
up copolymer-1 ... The phrase might refer (2) to molecular weight
as calculated by taking all the different-sized molecules in the mix
that makes up copolymer-1 and calculating the average weight,
i.e., adding up the weight of each molecule and dividing by the
number of molecules . . . Or, the phrase might refer (3) to
molecular weight as calculated by taking all the different sized
molecules in the mix that makes up copolymer-1 and calculating
their average weight while giving heavier molecules a weightrelated bonus when doing so.57
The district court held the patent claims were sufficiently definite, as

51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 1281.
Id. at 1285.
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015).
Id.

55.
56.

Id.
Id. at 835-36.

57.

Id.
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a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the term "molecular
weight" was calculated pursuant to the first method.ss Therefore, the trial
court held that the patent was valid.59
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found the opposite. 60 The Federal
Circuit discounted the district court's subsidiary findings and held the
term "molecular weight" was indefinite, so the claims at question were
therefore invalid.61 In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Circuit
reviewed de novo all the findings of the district court, including the
underlying factual findings. 62 The Supreme Court, therefore, was
confronted with the question that the Federal Circuit had considered
answered since its ruling in Lighting Ballast affirming Cybor.63
The Court began its analysis by citing to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 52(a)(6),64 which requires appellate courts to defer to the
factual findings of the district courts unless they are "clearly
erroneous." 65 The Court reiterated that Rule 52(a)(6) expresses a clear
command to all appellate courts and applies to all factual findings,
indiscriminately. 66 The Court stated "[o]ur opinion in Markman neither
created, nor argued for, an exception to Rule 52(a)." 67
Before describing the required hybrid standard mandated by the
combination of Rule 52(a) and Markman II, the Court clarified what it
actually decided in Markman II. Specifically, the Court repeated the
arguments that, as a matter of policy, judicial construction of patent
claims is the superior option. 68 The analogy to construction of other legal
instruments, including contracts (which was hardly mentioned in
Markman II) was the main supporting argument in this part of the
opinion. 69 Ironically, some of the arguments supporting juries as fact
finders, which were discounted by the Court in Markman II, were
asserted here by the Court to argue for deference to the district courts. 70
Finally, the Court explained how the new hybrid standard was to be
applied in the future by the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit had
argued that parsing between factual findings and legal conclusions would
58.
59.

Id.
Id.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 723 F.3d 1363, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1369.
Id.
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 836 (2015).
Id.
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6).

66.

Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 836.

67.

Id. at 837.

68.
69.

Id.
Id.

70.

See id. at 838 (citingMarkman II for the proposition that the fact-finder will be required

to make "credibility judgments" between expert witnesses).
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be too difficult a task. 71 The Court responded by pointing out that courts
of appeal have long made this distinction and successfully delineated
between findings of fact and law.72 Moving to the procedure, the Court
stated the initial task of construction begins with the four corners of the
patent.7 3 At this initial step, only intrinsic evidence is to be used to
construe the claims and their terms.7 4 If, after examining the patent, a
claim term (or terms) is so technical as to be ambiguous, the district courts
may consider extrinsic evidence. 75 This evidence would be used to
determine the meaning of the term to people of ordinary skill in the art at
the relevant time period.7 6 If these underlying facts are disputed, the
courts would be required to make subsidiary factual findings as to the
credibility of the extrinsic evidence. 77 This subsidiary fact finding will be
reviewed for "clear error" on appeal. 78
PART II

A. Reversal Rates in the U.S. Court ofAppealsfor the FederalCircuit
After the Supreme Court's opinion in Markman II, everything
changed in the world of patent claim construction. A new procedure was
required, consisting of a pretrial hearing to construe the patent, which
normally consists of expert testimony and evidence to establish the
meaning of disputed terms. 79 This Markman hearing is now known as a
"trial before the trial."so Most patent practitioners are of the opinion the
entire case can be won or lost at this Markman hearing.8 1 But of course,
until the Teva decision, both parties had to re-litigate the entire issue of
claim construction in the Federal Circuit. Against this backdrop,
numerous empirical studies were performed to analyze whether the
intended goals of uniformity and efficiency were being accomplished
under this process.
An empirical analysis performed in 2010 endeavored to elucidate the
pre-Markman I reversal rates for patent claim term construction in the
71.

Id. at 839.

72.

Id.

73.

Id. at 841.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

79. See, e.g., Menell et al., supranote 4, at 732.
80. See, e.g., id. at 806 (describing the various procedures established in multiple
jurisdictions).
8 1.

See, e.g., supra note 4.
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Federal Circuit. 82 The analysis utilized a database of all patent claim
construction cases decided by the Federal Circuit between 1991 and
2008.83 This study focused on the pre-Markman I period from 1991 to
1995,84 a period of time that many scholars and experts had largely
neglected until this study.85 The results of the analysis statistically
showed the pre-Markman I reversal rate for patent claim construction in
the Federal Circuit was 20.8%.86 This study also analyzed other time
periods as well, finding the reversal rate in the Federal Circuit climbed to
32% in the years between Cybor and Phillips.87
Other studies, which both predated and came after it, have performed
similar empirical analyses on post-Markman II reversal rates of claim
construction in the Federal Circuit. A robust analysis conducted in 2001
delved into the data to determine exactly what was happening two years
after Markman 11.88 This analysis was limited to a two-year period
ranging 1998 to 2000.89 The analysis showed that the Federal Circuit
reversed all cases at a rate of 36.6%,90 which is quite high. When the
analysis was narrowed to just express reversals of claim constructions,
the reversal rate fell slightly to 29.6%.91 Over the two-year period that
was analyzed, an increasing trend of reversals was statistically correlated
to time. 92 This proved that the Federal Circuit was more likely to reverse
a case on the basis of an error in claim construction as time went on.
Another significant analysis from this study focused on the
relationship between the types of decisions appealed and the reversal
rates. The analysis looked at the reversal rates for summary judgements
and jury or bench trials, among other types, to see which was reversed at
a higher rate. 93 The study showed the Federal Circuit affirmed 52% of
summary judgements and 45% of jury or bench trials during the period.9 4
The study also found that once the Federal Circuit found an error in claim
construction, it reversed 70% of summary judgements, 67% of bench
trials, and 64% of jury verdicts. 95 These extremely high reversal rates,
consistent across different types of judgments, can only be explained by
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

David L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, 43 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1073 (2010).
Id. at 1089.
Id.
Id. at 1091.
Id. at 1093.
Id.
Chu, supra note 4, at 1079.
Id. at 1092.
Id. at 1100.
Id. at 1104.
Id.
Id. at 1111.
Id.
Id. at 1113.
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the main constant in all of them: a de novo standard of review.
There are countless analytical studies that consistently show an
alarmingly high rate of reversal for patent claim construction in the
Federal Circuit. 9 6 To describe the details of each study would be
redundant and unnecessary, but the point is well made. The de novo
standard of review, as a result of the Supreme Court holding that claim
construction is a matter of law, did not result in consistency or uniformity.
Clearly, the goals of Congress in establishing the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit had been frustrated by the Circuit up to the point
of the Supreme Court's decision in Teva. 9 7
B. Reversal Rates After the Teva Hybrid Standardwas Adopted
The Supreme Court clarified the appropriate standard of review in its
Teva opinion in 2015. As this case was decided recently, empirical
studies on the effects of the hybrid standard are, regrettably, scarce. One
study, focusing on a very small sample of cases, showed that a major
factor in the reversal rate on appeal was whether the district court relied
on extrinsic evidence. 98 The Federal Circuit has interpreted Teva as
creating a two-step analysis for claim construction on appeal. 99 First, a
patent is construed as a matter of law according to the four corners
only.10 0 If intrinsic evidence is solely relied upon, only the de novo
standard of review applies on appeal. 10 1 Interestingly enough, the Federal
Circuit has also interpreted Teva to allow the Circuit to disregard the
subsidiary factual findings of the district courts where only intrinsic
evidence is relied on to construe the patent. 102 By ignoring the factual
findings regarding extrinsic evidence and relying on intrinsic evidence
alone to construe the claims, the Federal Circuit can sidestep the "clear
error" standard completely.
The Teva decision by the Federal Circuit on remand is a clear example
of this sidestepping. 103 The Federal Circuit found there was sufficient
intrinsic evidence to hold the claim term "molecular weight" was
indefinite, so the Circuit invalidated those claims in the patent. 104 This
conclusion was contrary to the explicit dictates of the Supreme Court's
opinion. The Court instructed the Federal Circuit to defer to the factual
96.
97.
98.
Circuit's
99.

See supra text accompanying note 7.
Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015).
Cassandra E. Havens, Teva v. Sandoz: The Supreme Court Rejects MillennialFederal
"ClearlyErroneous" Review Standard, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 399 (2016).
Id. at 421.

100.

Id.

101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1338.
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findings of the district court, unless the findings were the product of
"clear error." 105 Yet the Federal Circuit decided the issue based only on
intrinsic evidence, ignoring the factual findings of the district court
altogether. 106 Therefore, the Federal Circuit is still finding ways to
exclusively apply the de novo standard of review, making it probable that
the high reversal rates for claim construction in the Federal Circuit will
remain constant.
PART III
A. Reevaluating the Flaws in Markman II
The Supreme Court's decision in Markman II was the first major step
leading to the current state of uncertainty. Aptly summarized by Chief
Judge Mayer in Cybor, the Court rested its holding in Markman II almost
exclusively in a policy judgment that judges were better suited to construe
patents. The Supreme Court was correct in stating that history was no
guide for determining whether the Seventh Amendment provided a right
to a jury trial. The main reason for this ambiguity in the historical record
is the fact that the practice of claiming in patent applications did not
become common until the late nineteenth century. 107 Prior to claiming,
specifications were used to guide courts in determining the scope of
patents. 108 The Court stated that contemporary claim construction was
most similar to eighteenth century specification construction. But claims
in a patent are substantially different from the specification, which is why
they both exist in the first place.
Equating the two was the first mistake the Court made in Markman.
Claims are used to specifically define the scope of the patented subject
matter, and increasingly contain many highly technical terms. Even
judges with technical backgrounds, of which there are few, find it
incredibly challenging to educate themselves on these technical terms. 109
As a result, extrinsic evidence is increasingly relied on by judges when
construing disputed or technical terms in patent claims. 110 As claim
construction is dispositive in a high percentage of cases, all parties to the
litigation have the incentive to furnish expert testimony, and other
evidence, supporting their interpretation of the claim term (or terms).
105.
106.

Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 840-41 (2015).
Teva, 789 F.3d at 1341.

107. J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference:A Historical, Empirical, and
Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 8-21 (2014).

108.

Id.

109.

HENRY FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 156-57 (1973).

110. See, e.g., Havens, supra note 98, at 415-18; Michael Goodman, What's So Special
About PatentLaw?, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 797, 829-34 (2016).
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B. Determining Underlying Facts Should Be a Jury Task
In this context, Justice Souter's pronouncement in Markman II that
credibility decisions would only be needed in the rarest cases is flatly
contradicted. In fact, a close reading of the Court's opinion in Teva
indicates the Court is now citing Markman II for the opposite proposition.
In arguing that claim construction necessarily was a mixed question of
law and fact, the Court in Teva cited to Markman II for the proposition
that trial courts will need to regularly make credibility determinations
between experts. This is the exact opposite of the argument espoused in
Justice Souter's opinion in Markman II, and it cuts in favor of the
argument that juries would be better suited to construe contested claim
terms. Thus, even the Court has reversed course on some of the policy
arguments underlying its Markman II decision.
In light of this clear about-face, the Court felt it necessary in Teva to
strengthen the arguments that claim construction is a question for the
judge to decide. The Court argued that construction of the entire patent,
as a whole, was substantially similar to construction of other legal
instruments, such as contracts."' But even as the Court made this
analogy, it pointed out the flaw in its own argument: when terms in a
contract are disputed, the meaning of the disputed term becomes a
question of fact for the fact-finder to decide. 112 As a question of fact, the
meaning of the disputed term in the contract falls to the jury in a large
amount of jurisdictions. 113 This is the exact factual situation that
confronted the Court in Markman II: a term of art was used in a claim,
and that term was disputed. If the Court were to treat the construction of
that disputed term exactly the same as most courts treat the construction
of ambiguous contract terms, the Court should have held that juries are
the ones who decide the meaning of the disputed or technical term.
Additionally, it took the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court almost
two decades to finally arrive at the hybrid standard of review espoused in
Teva. But just imagine for a moment what would have happened if, in
Markman II, the Court had decided that juries were better suited to decide
the subsidiary factual issues in patent claim construction. The Federal
Circuit would have been required to review the factual findings of the
jury under the more deferential standard of "substantial evidence." 1 14
Almost twenty years of uncertainty and inefficiencies would have been
partly alleviated if the Court had at least gone that far in Markman II.
Instead, patent litigators and district courts were left with cases like Cybor
111.

Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 837-38 (2015).
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and Lighting Ballast.
C. Constructionof the Whole Patent Should Be a Jury Task
Although the ultimate question of infringement is reserved for the
jury, some will argue the judge should still construe the patent as a whole,
even if the jury were to construe the underlying disputed terms as a matter
of fact. This argument would more accurately comport with the Court's
decision in Teva and the analogous process of contract construction. So
then why should juries, instead of judges, construe patents as a whole,
and not just the disputed terms? The answer to that question is simple:
countless studies show that judges, regardless of experience or training,
are constantly reversed at an alarmingly high rate in the Federal Circuit.
These studies also show increasing dependence on extrinsic evidence
during the Markman procedures in trial courts. This increasing use of
extrinsic evidence at the trial level means factual determinations are
increasingly being made by the trial courts. If the goals of Congress and
the Court (in Markman II and Teva) of supplying uniformity and
efficiency in this area of the law are being frustrated by the current
system, then a shift in the law is needed. As more factual determinations
are made at the trial level, the argument for the shift to jury construction
of the patent as a whole becomes correspondingly stronger.
In the decades since the Court's decision in Markman II, many
scholars have analyzed the Federal Circuit's reversal rates of courts with
more patent law experience, and compared those to the reversal rates of
courts with less patent law experience. If, as the Court suggested in
Markman II, judges are better equipped to construe patents as a whole,
then judges with more training or experience in patent law would be
reversed at a much lower rate in the Federal Circuit. In a 2001 study,
judges were grouped into one of two groups: the "more active tribunal
group" and the "less active tribunal group." 115 Included in the "more
active tribunal" group were district courts which were reviewed more
than ten times by the Federal Circuit during the studied time period, as
well as the Court of Federal Claims and the International Trade
Commission. 1 16 The reversal rate for the "less active tribunals" was 410%,
whereas the reversal rate for the "more active tribunals" was 34%. 117
There is a small difference between the rates favoring the "more active
tribunals." But the "more active tribunals" are still being reversed at an
alarmingly high rate, including courts with exclusive jurisdiction over
patent issues at the trial level. Thus, the current system leads to a large
amount of vertical uncertainty in the realm of patent claim
115.
116.
117.

Chu, supra note 4, at 1121-22.
Id.
Id. at 1123.
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Another study, conducted in 2008, focused specifically on individual
district court judges and showed that the second most active district in the
country in terms of patent litigation, the Central District of California,
had the highest reversal rate during the studied time frame. 119 This study
also analyzed whether judges with more cases appealed to the Federal
Circuit, leading to more feedback for the judges, were reversed at a lower
rate over time. 12 0 It would be safe to assume that more feedback from the
Federal Circuit to a particular judge on issues of claim construction would
lead to a lower reversal rate for that judge over time. Yet the study found
quite the opposite, as the highest rate of reversal correlated to judges that
were reviewed by the Federal Circuit at least four times. 12 1
All these studies clearly suggest that judges with considerable
expertise and experience in patent law are just as, if not more, likely to
be reversed on issues of claim construction in the Federal Circuit. It is
patently obvious from the data that judges, experienced or not, find it
incredibly hard to properly construe patents. The main arguments for
judicial construction are that judges are more educated, more
experienced, and have more opportunity to learn from the practice of
construing claims over time. But if experience, training, education, and
feedback all do not improve judicial aptitude, then there are few
arguments left to support this premise of judicial superiority in claim
construction. It seems evident from these studies that juries can at least
construe claims as well as judges do.
Furthermore, it comes as no surprise that parties are unwilling to settle
after an adverse claim construction in the trial court with this uncertainty
looming. 122 The uncertainty makes it incredibly hard for adverse parties
to value their cases reliably. From an economics perspective, this makes
118. Ted Sichelman, Myths of (Un)Certainty at the Federal Circuit, 43 Loy. L.A. L. REv.
1161, 1187-88 (2010) (arguing that claim construction leads to most of the vertical uncertainty in
the Federal Circuit).
119. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 246.
120. Id. at 251.
121. Id. at 252.
122. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 138 F.3d 1448, 1475 n.15 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc)

(Rader, J., dissenting) ("Three variables affect the settlement calculus of each party to litigation:
p, the probability of the plaintiff obtaining damages; J, the expected value of a judgment for the
plaintiff; and c, the cost of litigation. See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and
Reform 89-94 (1996). If p x J (pJ) exceeds c, then plaintiff will sue. The plaintiff values the case
at pJ - c. If the defendant agrees on the values assigned to the variables, the suit will cost him pJ
+ c. This rough model poses an interesting question. Because the costs of litigation invariably
exceed the costs of settlement, why do not all cases settle? Chief Judge Posner answers:
" [U]ncertainty as to outcome is the key to the settlement rate. . . ." Id. at 90. This uncertainty leads
each party to overestimate its chance of prevailing. Accordingly, each party will assign different
values to the variables, most notably p, thereby diminishing the likelihood of settlement.").
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it difficult for adverse parties to value cases in a way that is conducive to
settlement. Furthermore, with such a high rate of reversal, why wouldn't
a litigant press on to the Federal Circuit? There is a 1 in 3 chance that the
Federal Circuit will reverse the district court's claim construction on
appeal. All of this means litigants are spending more money on litigation,
the courts are using more resources, and the Federal Circuit's docket is
bogged down with more appeals of claim construction issues. Therefore,
efficiency is not being served by the current process of claim
construction.
D. The Way Forward
The Supreme Court made a valiant effort to bring more uniformity
and efficiency to this area of the law with its decision in Teva. The Court
was correct in realizing that a more deferential standard of review was
mandated under the Federal Rules. The Court was also correct in noting
that a more deferential standard would reduce the reversal rates in the
Federal Circuit. But, the Federal Circuit essentially ignored the Court in
the Teva case on remand. To some, there might be nothing wrong with
this intentional sidestepping of the Court's Teva opinion. However, as for
the impact on the goals of uniformity and efficiency, this sidestepping
will lead to a continuation of the same trends the Court sought to remedy
in Teva.
In this context, the path forward seems clear. Everyone desires more
uniformity and efficiency in the area of patent claim construction law.
The Supreme Court attempted to reduce uncertainty by requiring the
Federal Circuit to review the subsidiary factual findings of the district
courts for clear error. The Federal Circuit subsequently thumbed its
metaphorical nose at the Court, and has increasingly based its decisions
on patent claim construction solely on intrinsic evidence. At the same
time, patents have become increasingly technical, so trial courts have
become increasingly dependent on extrinsic evidence. Unless the Court
takes a more drastic step than it did in Teva, this area of the law will
continue to suffer from uncertainty and inefficiency.
The Court should reverse its holding from Markman II as a matter of
policy, and should characterize patent claim construction as an issue of
fact for the jury to determine, except in cases where the patent is
undisputedly clear on its face as a matter of law. Under this procedure,
the judge should first decide whether any terms in the relevant patent are
disputed or technical terms of art as a matter of law. If no terms are
disputed or technical terms of art, the judge should construe the patent as
a matter of law relying only on the four corners of the patent.
If, on the other hand, the judge determines that the parties have
sufficiently demonstrated that the patent at issue has disputed or technical
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terms of art, for which extrinsic evidence must be utilized, the
construction of those terms should be a question of fact for the jury to
decide. The jury would hear the extrinsic evidence so it would be better
suited than the solitary district court judge to make credibility
determinations. Also, the jury would bring a variety of diverse
experiences and backgrounds to the table, making it a more robust
analytical entity than the single district court judge. The jury would then
construe the disputed or technical terms in light of the entire patent.
Special verdict forms, containing a question identifying the jury's
interpretation of each disputed or technical term, should be utilized in the
trial court to insure the construction of each term is stated explicitly. On
appeal, the Federal Circuit would review all determinations by the jury
on issues of claim construction for "substantial evidence."
There would still be cases where the trial judge would be able to
construe the patent as a matter of law, but those cases would be rare. The
best guarantee that these cases would be rare is the adversarial nature of
the American judicial system. In those rare cases though, the Federal
Circuit would review the trial court's construction of the patent de novo.
This proposed procedure would diminish the vertical uncertainty that
exists at present, and would reduce the sidestepping ability of the Federal
Circuit.
As to horizontal uncertainty, the Court in Teva actually stated contrary
to Justice Souter's pronouncement in Markman II that issue preclusion
would apply in some cases. 123 Admittedly, there would still be cases
where the same language from the same patent would produce differing
jury constructions in different proceedings. But, when balanced against
the well documented vertical uncertainty and its economic repercussions,
this horizontal uncertainty is the lesser of the two evils. This procedure
would create an environment more conducive to settlements of claims as
appellate review would be highly deferential in most cases, and case
values would be easier to predict. This would in turn cut down on
litigation costs, reduce the burden of constant appeals on the Federal
Circuit, and free up the docket of the Circuit to decide other pressing
matters.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court ruled in Markman II that judges were more suited
to the task of patent construction as a matter of policy. In the struggle to
curtail the unintended ramifications of that decision, the Court tried to
partially alleviate the uncertainty and inefficiency by establishing the
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hybrid standard in Teva. The Federal Circuit has found a convenient way
to continue business as usual. So, the Federal Circuit continues to
frustrate the original intent of Congress in creating the court. A drastic
change is needed to alleviate the current uncertainty, as it is fostering
inefficiency. Thus, the Court should reverse Markman II and hold that a
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial attaches to patent claim
construction. In doing so, the Court would effectively diminish the
staggering vertical uncertainty, stifle litigation, and increase efficiency at
the trial and appellate court levels. Until the Court does this, or something
similar, 124 the world of patent litigation will continue to be a volatile
world where the only certainty is uncertainty.

124. See, e.g., Edward V. Di Lello, Fighting Fire With Firefighters:A ProposalforExpert
Judges at the Trial Level, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 499 (1993) (proposing the establishment of
expert magistrate judges); Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due
Process, 107 YALEL.J. 1535, 1681 (1998) (arguing that scientifically or technically trainedjudges
should decide cases at the trial level where scientific or technical facts are in issue); Eric B. Cheng,
Alternatives to DistrictCourt PatentLitigation: Reform by Enhancing the Existing Administrative
Options, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1135, 1162 (2010) (suggesting shifting more patent cases to the
International Trade Commission); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444,
1490 (2010) (arguing a change to venue rules requiring patent litigation to stay close to home
would foster experience in certain areas of technology prominent in that geographic area);
Goodman, supra note 110, at 845 (proposing an expansion of the Patent and Trademark Appeals
Board (PTAB) to make it the exclusive forum for addressing issues of patent validity).

